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EVIL FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

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I. Introduction

Evil is a phenomenon that exists and has always existed only in the human world. Animals know nothing of it. But there is no form of religion, of ethics, or of community life in which it is not important. What is more, we need to discriminate between evil and good in our daily life with others, and as psychologists in our professional work. And yet it is difficult to give a precise definition of what we mean by these terms psychologically.

In our everyday speech, we use the terms good and evil as though they were opposites—good having the “highest” moral value and evil the “lowest.” These standards are always binding on a specific community, and are obligatory for the individual. In large measure they are emotionally toned. Therefore, to commit evil usually causes feelings of sin and guilt—and also fear of punishment.

It would exceed the framework of this lecture to discuss in detail the philosophical and metaphysical meaning of good and evil. I shall therefore not consider what good and evil are intrinsically: whether evil is only a *privatio boni*, for example, or whether evil as such actually exists; or whether it even is included in the Divine plan for salvation. Nor shall I touch upon the question of whether there is an “a priori” knowledge of good and evil. Neither shall we concern ourselves with the historical aspects of the moral law—that is, its variations according to time and place. On the other hand, it is important that we have some common understanding of the moral code which, more or less as “unwritten law,” determines the

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value system of our Western culture. It will be agreed that our cultural canon is to a great extent outlined in the Mosaic Law and the Christian commandments to practice brotherly love and love of truth and to strive for perfection. Quite concretely, Judaeo-Christian morality means: Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not commit adultery—but hate, intolerance, and egoism are also evil. In general, as Kerényi has beautifully demonstrated,¹ we consider everything which kills and destroys to be evil. Kant attempted to give the moral law a universally valid formula with his categorical imperative: "I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will my maxim should become a universal law."²

In this lecture I am confining myself to the *psychological* problem of evil. Psychology has essentially to do with facts and their relationships, and not with moral precepts. However, the values of traditional morality and of religion are not meaningless for the psychologist. Quite the contrary! Community life and education force every single human being to come to terms with these values. Very often it is just the collision with the accepted collective values which brings the individual into the consulting room of a psychological adviser. His encounter, not only with the problem of evil, but also with the problem of good, involves him in conflicts which damage his creativity and distort his human relationships.

In view of such situations, one asks oneself: What are good and evil, taken psychologically? Do they coincide with collective morality? Is it possible, under certain circumstances, for good to *inhibit* human development? And, on the other hand, can evil be *good* for man?

The psychological problem of good and evil is especially impressive in so-called "conflicts of duty." Think of the conflict between traditional morality and the inner voice of conscience! The tension between these two can reach such a pitch that the powers of decision are completely paralyzed. This can happen, for instance, when what we inwardly feel to be "good" is accounted "evil" by the moral code or vice versa. We find striking examples for such situations in the Old Testament. Was it "evil," for example, when Jacob cheated his brother Esau out of the rights of the firstborn?

If so, then why did God later bestow upon him the name Israel? Or what should our attitude be, psychologically, toward the problem raised by the sacrifice of Isaac? What went on in Abraham's soul when he decided—against the universal moral code—to obey God's command and to kill his son? (Illustration IIb) Looked at psychologically, he was faced with the decision either to follow the universal commandment not to kill, or to become the murderer of his son. Kierkegaard rightly stresses the fact that—along with the generally accepted moral plane—there is also a religious plane, on which the individual enters into an inner, subjective relationship with God and feels himself individually responsible to Him.³ Is it not strange that in such cases betrayal, or even murder, are said to be willed by God? Apparently there exists an evil which is not evil.

An entirely different area of problems has to do with the question: How far is the individual capable of living in accordance with his own moral ideas, and of realizing them? Here we touch upon another very ancient problem, which has occupied man since the beginning of time. Long ago St. Paul admitted: "For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." (Rom. 7:19) This is the expression of a deep truth: that evil is a reality which—in spite of our best intentions—cannot be avoided.

II. The Culture Canon and Evil

In empirical psychology, concern with the problem of good and evil is of only recent date. It was the impoverishment of human vitality and the moral hopelessness at the end of the Victorian age which led to a revival of psychological research. The effects upon culture of an oppressive morality, of false ideals, and of self-deceptions, were so negative that a psychological reconsideration of the whole moral problem became unavoidable. An essentially formal and rationalistically oriented psychology could offer little toward the understanding of the suffering of the individual. For this understanding there was needed full consideration of the human subject's values as well as his emotions. From several directions at once—from critics of cultural and social values, from psychopathologists,

from students of the psychology of religion—came new ideas which broke down what had become a rigid system of rationalistic psychology. Nietzsche led the way. In a sort of Copernican inversion, he declared that the cultural canon was itself responsible for the moral decadence. Independently of Nietzsche, Freud, too, saw one of the essential roots of neurosis in civilization itself, and in the related psychic factor of the superego. James and Jung, on the contrary, connected the moral suffering of man and his neurosis not primarily with civilization, but with the one-sidedness of the individual, with his rigid moral attitude, and they recognized that healing depended upon the restoration of the disturbed relationship between the ego and the self.

It appears to me essential to glance briefly at Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas, since they not only influenced the spirit of our time, but also in large measure determined the development of depth psychology. He was one of the first to emphasize the subjective factor in morality: man is himself the measure of his own values; it is the emotional man who sees and who evaluates. Nietzsche said that to submit to morality is not in itself moral. Man is only genuine and creative when his evaluations are determined by his emotions and his will to live. What strengthens man is therefore good; whatever weakens him, or stunts his life, is evil. Time and again Nietzsche found that moral ideas or Christianity's love-thy-neighbor-as-thyself in no way increase moral sensitivity. Morality has become a façade, and brotherly love an hypocrisy. His ultimate criticism was directed at the Christian aeon itself, against the moral law which is determined by the Judaeo-Christian image of God. It was here that Nietzsche saw the deeper cause for the "denaturalization of natural values" in his time, and for the impoverishment of instinct. It was the wish to free man from the "falsification" of the moral view which made him challengingly assert: "We must liberate ourselves from morality in order to be able to live morally."⁶ It should not disturb us that Nietzsche at one time refers to the collective aspect of morality and next time to the subjective aspect. For, as the following quotation shows, his concern was essentially with the individual's faithfulness to himself. "They will call you

destroyers of morality, but you are only the discoverers of yourselves."⁷ This new view of morality, however, led him too far when he asserted that "morality" always reverts into its opposite when it is dogmatized as an absolute—that is, whenever it becomes *the* truth and *the* ideal. Wherever morality is sought purely in and for itself—as the true, the perfect, or the good—it becomes, he said, unquestionably immoral; yes, even evil itself! Nietzsche turns morality upside down. His doctrine is known as the "transvaluation of values." According to this theory, what is considered by the collective to be good may be evil and, conversely, what is collectively considered evil can be exactly that which is good for a creative individual.

With these ideas Nietzsche initiated a fundamentally new viewpoint. He demonstrated that what man repudiates as immoral is precisely what actually happens. He also showed that every attempt to make values and ideals "absolute" inevitably leads to the suppression of drives and instincts. So we have gained from him a sharp knife with which to separate the genuine from the pseudo. Insofar as his assertion: "Morality? It destroys itself" means that the setting up of conventional morality as an "absolute" causes life to become stale, or that every religion which pretends to be the only good and true one loses its vital relationship to the transcendent, we can agree with him. But when he concludes that emotions and passions must be allowed to go their way, without any restraints, we can no longer follow him. By glorifying "blind" life he falls victim to the dangerous antithesis of morality—the blind following of instinctual impulses, which leads unavoidably to the dissolution and destruction of civilization.

In spite of many overstatements, exaggerated formulations, and even dangerous assertions—some of which were used to back up National Socialist propaganda—Nietzsche's ideas were extremely fruitful for depth psychology. His unmasking of hidden feelings and pseudospiritual ideals not only prepared the way for the Freudian theory of repressions, slips of the tongue, and symptomatic actions, but also led directly to the psychology of the shadow, as developed by Jung.⁸

Like Nietzsche, Freud judged the effects of the collective

morality upon the individual to be highly negative. In the culture canon, with its prohibitions, restrictions, and demands for self-sacrifice, he saw the supreme example of instinct repression. For Freud it makes no difference whether this "negation of life" derives from an original disposition to aggression, or from an archaic inheritance of taboos and prohibitions;¹⁰ in either case the individual experiences something demonic and evil which threatens to destroy his will to live. This situation is dramatically accentuated in the conflict between the child's incestuous wishes and his fear of castration, which is projected on the person of his father. Freud shows that it is the unsuccessful defense against instinctual wishes incompatible with the paternal "no" which causes the individual to become psychically ill. The most serious form of such a psychic reaction-formation is the introjection of the castration-threat into the ego. This is manifested later as the superego, by means of which the individual, half consciously and half unconsciously, makes the father's aggression, and with it the cultural restrictions upon instinct, his own table of law. As a categorical imperative, as conscience, and as the cause of a permanent, lurking guilt-feeling, the superego destroys the healthy spontaneity of the adult ego, just as the paternal "no" destroyed that of the child. So we see that Freud, like Nietzsche, judged morality by its effect on the vitality of the individual. "*Evil, for him, is that which impairs the instincts.*" In short, evil is identical with collective morality.

Freud's as well as Nietzsche's criticism of the culture canon leads us to the question: "Is Western morality really so negative that it necessarily makes people neurotic and saps their vitality?"

One need only put the question clearly in order to realize the one-sidedness of an affirmative answer. We cannot ignore the fact that Western consciousness is based on Christian principles of morality. Without moral ideals, without the domestication of primitive man, and without self-sacrifice and renunciation within the community, Western man would never have achieved conscious orientation or mental development. Therefore the Christian aeon cannot simply be condemned. It is true that collective morality has no unconditionally positive effect on man, but neither does

it necessarily damage or weaken the psyche. Yet it is possible to determine under what conditions the cultural canon can become negative—yes, even evil. It becomes negative whenever the individual takes its commandments and prohibitions as absolutes, and ignores his other impulses. *It is not the cultural canon itself, therefore, but the moral attitude of the individual, which we must hold responsible for what is pathological, negative, and evil.* The more the individual identifies himself with the values of the cultural canon, the more dubious the effects of his attitude upon the psyche. Or, stated in other words: *the more one-sided the conscious attitude is, the more one-sided the unconscious counter tendency will be!* This holds true whenever moral values become "absolutes."

Freud saw quite correctly that a too powerful superego, resulting from a negative father image, leads to neurosis. We find cases just as frequently, however, in which a negative mother image is the basis of a neurosis. In this case, the individual is usually conditioned to an untroubled and uninhibited habit of life and an overindulgence of his emotions. *Too little morality is just as damaging to the psyche as too much!*

First let us take *perfectionism* which is a well-known form of one-sidedness. We meet this in various areas: as an excessive demand for perfection in achievement, in virtue, or even in truthfulness. Achievement naturally has a moral value. But, there are situations in which it has negative effects. It is astounding how difficult it is to see the results of a one-sided striving for perfection in the proper light. For instance, a scientific paper may never get finished because no sentence is allowed to stand as it is. Or a woman who is trying her best to follow some ascetic ideal may be foiled again and again by encountering only primitive and instinctual would-be partners. And think of Bismarck—that perfect example of a follower of the slogan: "Where there is a will, there is a way"—who was constantly overcome, against his will, by fits of crying. The results of perfectionism cannot be better characterized than in the words of Nietzsche: "... the more fundamentally we desire the one the more completely we shall achieve the other."¹¹ We seek for the ideal, but what we find is the sick animal.

These and similar facts cause us to reflect upon the question: Why, and to what purpose, does just what is negative and unsatisfying have to happen to us in certain situations? Such reflections should not lead us to "throw out the baby with the bath water," or to live out our weaknesses. On the contrary, they should help us to consider the "truth" concealed in our personal feelings and instincts. As Pascal said: *Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas*. A little less reason and a little less perfection often have more favorable influences on life than the striving for the "best," or the "perfect." One may be less worthy of admiration, but instead perhaps more genuine and dependable, and better adapted to reality. The saying *Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien* fits here, too.

However, neurotic and evil effects come not only from perfectionism but also from a lack of moral principles. Individuals lacking such principles easily fall under the influence of others; without knowing how it happened, they find themselves the victims of other people's suggestive influences. Someone "marries" them, for example; or they get entangled in adventurous love affairs, without realizing what they are doing. Such a lack of conscious orientation is often compensated for by unconscious feelings of guilt, or by an unconscious negativism which can even develop into an "unconscious" suicide attempt.

Both attitudes—perfectionism and the lack of moral principles—are accompanied by symptoms of severe repression, but in each case with different antecedents. In one case weakness or imperfection has been repressed; in the other, moral discipline has been disregarded. The dissociated content, however, in no way loses its efficacy, as the pioneers of depth psychology—Janet, Charcot, and Freud—have demonstrated. Quite the contrary; the deeper the repression, the more active the dissociated content. From its background in the unconscious, like a hidden kobold, it contrives all kinds of negative effects in the outer world. It can unexpectedly invade consciousness, and assume complete control of the conscious personality. In such cases one often has the impression that the psyche is being controlled by a "stranger" who appears as a "voice,"

as a "spirit," or even as an "overrated idea." This kobold, or "stranger" in the psyche, is at the root of every neurosis. It is also a fundamental cause of the individual's experience of evil—and, indeed, of the experience of his own individual evil.

III. Two Case Histories

At this point I should like to present two case histories from my experience as an analyst. The first is that of a man, who became ill from "too much morality"; the second, of one who had too little. The man in the first case, about forty-five years of age, was suffering the consequences of a pronounced perfectionism. He had grown up in a puritanical atmosphere. His father's strictness, as well as his own religious education, encouraged the development of an inflexible moral attitude. Consciously he felt duty-bound to keep the Ten Commandments. Above all, he was occupied with the admonition: "Whoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." (Matt. 5:28) He developed painful scruples concerning his relations with women. However he could not help letting his glance rest on a beautiful woman now and then. He was tormented by erotic fantasies, especially at night. His dread of sin manifested itself in a disguised form as a fear of falling from an elevation such as a scaffold, or a tower.

It is interesting to see how this man's inner situation was illustrated in his dreams. In the first dream he dreamed in Zürich, the "other side" of his personality was already discernible. He dreamed of a horse that seemed to be sick. It was unsteady on its legs, and its whole hindquarters were covered with excrement. It is easy to see from this dream fragment that his instinctive side is not only weakened, but soiled. And indeed it is the "posterior" side of this man's instinctual life—that which is connected with the sexual and the eliminatory functions—which appears to be not in good order. The dream image shows in a drastic way what is troubling the natural instinctive orientation of this man: there is something unclean—even foul-smelling—sticking to him, which one does not

speak of in public. That he is actually being "pursued" by this filthiness is shown in the next dream.

"I see a somewhat younger boy who is playing with other children. When I look at him more closely, I see that his body is completely covered with excrement, and that this is making him feel sick. The sight of him nauseates me, too, and I feel disgust in the pit of my stomach. As I start to leave, the boy tries to hold me back, and to throw some of the feces at me. I scold him and go away, more or less disgusted with it all. I wake with an indescribable feeling of disgust."

This dream shows the relation between the conscious tendency and the unconscious countertendency. The dreamer himself represents the conscious side of his personality; the boy covered with excrement the dissociated side. Because of its filthiness, the dissociated side stands in a definitely contradictory relation to the rigid and correct ego-personality. In spite of this, however, there is an inner bond uniting the puritanical dreamer and the dirty boy. Both are nauseated by the excrement. This partial identity is corroborated by the fact that, in reality, the dreamer wakes up every morning with an unpleasant feeling of tension in his stomach. The marked difference between them is that the man is clean, while the boy is dirty. Taken together, these opposites indicate a totality, but a totality that has been torn apart. Even so, they have a *tendency to approach one another*, as is shown by the boy's attempt to smear the dreamer with feces. This rather unusual method of approach can hardly be appreciated by the dreamer. In fact, he scolds the boy and goes away. His resistance to filth is, however, so intense that one has rather the impression that the dreamer is incapable of dealing with his repressed side. He remains stuck in the unconscious conflict. Consciously, he rejects the inferior side; unconsciously however, he appears to be held by the rejected and the unclean in the shape of the boy. We can conclude that too much subservience to conventional morality creates an equally strong opposite attachment to that which is prohibited. In fact, he is caught by overwhelming erotic fantasies of the sort that one really "should" not have.

About six weeks later I had an interesting experience with

this man. He told me that he had discovered something very important: it had occurred to him (and he was a Protestant teacher) that God could forgive. This was a tremendous event for him, for up to now his image of God had had the features of the Old Testament Jehovah: God had been not only a strict judge, but also a power "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and to the fourth generation." (Exod. 34:7) This development of the image of God from "judge" to "loving father" I considered very important. It was definitely an attempt to bring together the opposites of righteousness and instinct. It meant nothing less than a transformation of his image of God. At the same time, he gained a new understanding of the nature of man: he began to see that man consists not only of light, but also of darkness, even perversion. Only the image of a forgiving Father-God made it possible for him to become reconciled with his own abhorred evil, with his own weakness and imperfection. The change in his attitude toward the inner world was soon followed by a further development: the insight that the acceptance of oneself is intimately connected with the love of one's neighbor, and the acceptance of one's fellow man. Christian charity now appeared to him in a new light. Whereas he till now had been obsessed by an ideal of self-sacrificing altruism, which he himself could never measure up to, he understood for the first time the meaning of the passage in the Bible: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." (Matt. 19:19) He realized that only a person, who can accept himself as he is, is able also to accept his fellow man.

The second case upon which I should like to report shows the results of an attitude which can be described as a "lack of moral consciousness."

It concerns an educated, intellectually gifted man who, in spite of his knowledge and education, drifted through life in a rather naïve and thoughtless way. Although very methodical in his professional life, he showed himself to be undependable in his relation to women; he vacillated between being too compliant and too self-assertive. He was strongly fixated upon his mother and suffered at times from depressions. He had thus far hesitated to let himself

be harnessed to a woman by marriage. When he came to me, he was once more, and against his will, involved in a love affair. He was remarkably unclear about his own feelings, and very unconscious of his own moral standpoint.

After our first consultation he brought me the following dream, which reveals the extent of his unconsciousness.

"I am sitting at a table talking with my woman friend. An acquaintance of mine, a man whom I don't like because of his ugly face and morose expression, comes and sits at our table. To my extreme annoyance he ignores me completely, and begins to talk excitedly across me to my friend."

This dream impressed the dreamer greatly, especially because the man in the dream ignored him. He could not help being startled by the fact that such an unpleasant person could supersede him in the relation to his woman friend. It was apparent to me that the dream-ego did not play the active role here, but that some sinister character had usurped its place. The dream seemed to want to say to him: "The one who in fact is carrying on this love affair is not you, but someone else, who is just as ugly as your unpleasant acquaintance. He is ignoring you, just as you are apparently ignoring him. Do you want to go on living like this?" The direct result of this dream was a certain psychic shock, the beginning of an insight into what he was actually doing. The dreamer suddenly "remembered" that he had highly ambivalent feelings toward the girl, and that he had become involved with her more or less against his own will. It also dawned on him that his behavior toward her could hardly be called "nice," since he had actually promised to marry her, whereas at present he had no idea of doing so. Taken as a whole the dream had a favorable effect on the man, since it indirectly opened the way to moral reflections, such as he had never made before, upon his own behavior.

Whereas the dreams of the first man showed a dissociation between the morally inferior side of the personality and consciousness, the dream of the second shows the dream-ego as weakened—

that is, devalued—in favor of a morally inferior personality. We can also interpret this situation as the overshadowing of the conscious ego by a negative complex—negative, that is, from the standpoint of collective morality. It appears that what this man consciously wants, and morally upholds, carries no weight with the strange will within him. In an intellectual man, such as this one, the lack of moral reflection is highly suspect. Another peculiar fact is the lack of a compensatory, positive dream figure; this suggests an unconscious resistance to the moral development. On the strength of this hypothesis, and when the analysis began to stagnate about three weeks later, I asked quite abruptly: "Have you resistances to the analysis?" Immediately the answer came: "Yes! Consciousness only inhibits; it hinders direct action. Man's basic desire is for instinctual gratification, and for a life without reflection." Somewhat rhetorically he added: "Why can't one simply be bad?" This, then, was the root of the trouble! The man would rather muddle through life than take the trouble to reflect on the morality of his actions. Not only the intentional "forgetting" of his ambivalent feelings and the equally willful "forgetting" of his dreams, but also the "overlooking" of his own inability to accept the obligations of an erotic relationship, all point in this direction.

How far an individual wants to deceive himself about the moral consciousness of his actions is his own concern. What the analyst can contribute to the clarification of the problem consists solely in showing the patient what is actually happening to him, and in revealing to him his lack of moral consciousness. The analyst can never assume the responsibility for the final decision. This task always remains the patient's.

In these two men we can see the negative results of a one-sided attitude, whether excessively moral or insufficiently so. In the first analysis, the puritanical and perfectionist attitude is compensated by weakness and filthiness. In the second, it is as if the dreamer had been shown his morally inferior conscious behavior through a magnifying glass. In both cases, an "antagonist" within the personality plays the decisive role, and it would undoubtedly be an advantage for the person if he could realize this.

IV. *The Personal Shadow, or the Individual Evil*

It is the "other" in the psyche of the individual which Jung calls the "shadow." He prefers the term "shadow" to that of "evil" in order to differentiate between individual-evil and the evil in collective morality. *Jung conceives of the personal shadow as an unconscious part of the personality, which complements the conscious personality to form a relative totality.* In contrast to his predecessors, therefore, Jung begins with the totality of human personality. Even though "totality" is a borderline concept (*Grenzbegriff*), which is not empirically demonstrable, it is still a working model which enables us to make fruitful deductions in regard to the nature of the psyche. Therefore, although, strictly speaking, the psyche is not a closed system, this hypothesis allows us to differentiate two sides of the human personality, each side showing behavior which is more or less complementary to the other. According to what one is and wills consciously, the unconscious "other" will show a different aspect. The phenomena of the personal shadow are therefore correspondingly manifold.

The complementary relationship between the conscious and the unconscious personality was recognized not only by William James and Jung, but by Nietzsche before them, although in a somewhat different form, as the complementarity of value-concepts.¹² Nietzsche showed that the concept of good always implies the concept of evil, and that not only love and hate, but also the "yea" and the "nay" belong together—that is, complement each other. On the other hand it was James who, guided by his pragmatic viewpoint, recognized as early as 1902 the psychological importance of evil in religious experience.¹³ In a completely unprejudiced way, he maintained that religious suffering very often comes from a one-sided religious attitude, which has led to the exclusion and rejection of essential values. The effects of these unwanted behavior patterns, which are complementary to the conscious attitude, cannot be eliminated—as James shows in his study of conversion. In actual life both thesis and antithesis play accompanying parts.¹⁴ Let us return, now, to the phenomenology of the personal

shadow. To begin with an example from literature: in Nietzsche's book *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, the shadow is an earthbound figure who pursues the "smallest and most immediate things"¹⁵ of daily life, and who complements the inflated figure of the lonely wanderer on celestial heights. In *Zarathustra* the shadow appears as the "ugliest man,"¹⁶ the murderer of God, in contrast to the "wise man, who goes the way to greatness."¹⁷ As these examples show, the shadow appears personified in a figure of the same sex as the superior personality. Similarly, in dreams the shadow can appear as an egoistic counterpart to the idealized image of the ego-personality. It can also caricature the dreamer's attempted collective role in life by taking the complementary shape of a clown. Or the image of a fickle wench may cast doubt on a woman's conviction of her own unfailing fidelity.

In mythology it is above all the stories of dissimilar pairs of brothers which throw light on the relationship between the "one" and the "other." Here the shadow appears in the form of the "dark" brother who not only accompanies his "light" counterpart everywhere, but also intervenes in disturbing ways that cause conflicts. Cain killed Abel, the "light" brother favored by God; and Jacob cheated Esau out of the rights of the firstborn. The "dark" brother, however, is often of great value, as in the Gilgamesh epic. Only with the help of Enkidu, the primitive hunter and son of the steppes, the instinctual man, can the hero Gilgamesh accomplish his great tasks, which are to kill the heavenly bull as well as Humbaba, the terrible protector of the cedar woods. (Since the collective shadow has not yet been discussed, it should be pointed out here that Enkidu represents the personal and Humbaba the collective shadow of Gilgamesh. Humbaba stands for the wild untamed instinctuality which is common to all men. It compensates less for the individual contents of consciousness than for the spirit of the time.) By defeating Humbaba, Gilgamesh conquers the demonic seduction of instinct, which threatened to hinder his progress. In this mythologem of the dissimilar brother-pair can be seen the fundamental relation of the ego and the personal shadow. It represents both sides of the total personality, which always includes both thesis and antithesis. *The*

personal shadow is therefore always complementary to the ego and represents all those personal characteristics that the conscious personality does not wish to acknowledge.

When the moral attitude of the individual is more or less in agreement with cultural values, the personal shadow will be in large measure identical with what is collectively judged to be "evil." There are cases, however, in which the ego-personality is so dominated by the negative that it consciously lives out what is collectively unacceptable—for instance, being weak, untrustworthy, and incompetent, or cruel, lying, and aggressively disagreeable. In such cases the "light" side of the personality—the more dependable, the kinder, and the more truth-loving—is repressed into the unconscious, and can sometimes compensate for the lack of moral sense in consciousness. Then—in what is like a paradox—we can speak of a "positive" shadow. Our prognosis, however, should be very tentative, since such cases often border on the pathological.

The evolution of the personal shadow depends to a great extent on the development and differentiation of ego-consciousness. The more mature the ego-personality, the more dependable its orientation to life; and the more stable its sense of values, the more clearly will the shadow-personality take shape in the unconscious. The shadow is, therefore, a *normal* phenomenon, present in every human being, at least potentially, and is part of the natural process of achieving self-consciousness. Everything that does not fit in with the goals of consciousness, and is more or less incompatible with conscious values, will be *neglected, forgotten, or else repressed and suppressed* in the course of development. Among the elements that are incompatible with the ego-personality are those that follow the old pathways of nature and give human life its color and flavor. The *infantile* part of the individual, the part which has remained a child, belongs here; also emotional attachments—*fixations* on family members as well as on *previous attitudes* which appear immature to the adult personality. If the degree to which the shadow is incompatible with the conscious attitude is relatively high, the shadow takes on the form of a *neurotic* symptom. It then becomes a cause of disturbance, instability, and even physical illness. As such

it is pathological; it inhibits the flow of life and—considered psychologically—is an example of individual evil. In these cases the shadow is not different from any other repressed content.

However, the shadow's effect is not always negative; as we could see in the Gilgamesh epic, it can be of great value for the individual. As consciousness develops, part of the psychic contents remains still attached to elements of the shadow and sinks into the unconscious, where it retains *contact with the lost depths* of the soul, with life and vitality. Not only past experiences, emotions, feelings, and instincts remain active in the shadow, but also the superior, the universally human, yes, even the creative can be sensed there. Whoever remains connected with his shadow still radiates human warmth. Through his shadow the individual remains in touch with his natural, primitive side, and with his body. The shadow is like a natural companion who follows man, at his heels, so to speak, and whose "dark" presence is always more or less perceptible. To be aware of one's shadow, therefore, is a great advantage; and, as Chamisso's novel *Peter Schlemihl* impressively demonstrates, to "lose" one's shadow is extremely dangerous.¹⁸ For the one who gets hold of it, or to whom it has been relinquished, gains control of the soul. In the story of Schlemihl this is the Devil himself. One can also be born without a shadow and so lack all those characteristics that a person really requires if he is to become truly human. In *Die Frau ohne Schatten* (The Woman Without a Shadow),¹⁹ Hugo von Hofmannsthal depicted such a figure as the daughter of a king of the spirit world. Because of her lack of shadow she remained altogether excluded from the mystery of womanhood, of pregnancy, and of birth.

It is not an accident that the shadow is valued so highly among primitives. It is accounted a treasure which one has to protect. If one's shadow is injured, it means that one's actual life is also injured. The conception of a mystical relationship between a man and his shadow is expressed in many ways: whoever steps over the shadow of another person conquers him; whoever pierces his shadow—if only with a knife or a nail—has already slain him. Inversely, primitive men avoid the shadow of a powerful person, for to touch

it is dangerous and may bring death.

The personal shadow is therefore a highly important reality, a "dark" factor, which is always present and effective, and which is included in whatever we do. The more we take it into account, the more human we will be. It is the shadow which maintains the continuity between our soul and the ancestral spirits.

It is therefore not surprising that the shadow rouses strong emotional reactions. One needs only to touch it to come upon a complex, and immediately a reaction results. This can express itself in an inferiority feeling or a disturbance in relationships, or it can block the flow of thought. Wherever the shadow becomes activated, the individual adapts with more difficulty to the external world, and at the same time becomes more sensitive to what happens. Anyone who is not sure just where his shadow is at work can find out by paying attention to what happens against his own intentions. For example, he may fall victim to his own naïveté or credulousness and then be cheated. Or he may have to pay for ignoring the reality of the psyche by developing a chronic anxiety about marriage, love, or appearing in public.

The more affectively toned one's psychic impulses are, and the more obstinately one clings to feelings of hatred and revenge, the more sure it is that the shadow is constellated. Emotional shadow-reactions are the underlying cause of collisions with the environment, with friends, or with members of one's family. And it is usually a person of the *same sex* who especially "gets on one's nerves," or provokes one to aggressive remarks. As a rule this other person actually has characteristics which are contrary to one's conscious adaptation but have some resemblance to one's own shadow side and for this reason are particularly irritating. We call such a transference of unconscious psychic characteristics to another person *projection*. One can observe, for example, how the powerful and self-assured man becomes the *bête noire* of the typical intellectual. And, correspondingly, a woman whose sensuality is weak, or spiritualized, reacts negatively to women who radiate the warmth of primitivity and naturalness. Whenever two people are appropriate carriers of each other's shadow projections, the ground is naturally prepared for

misunderstandings and quarrels. Those cases are especially problematic in which each one resolutely sees the mistake in the other, and tries to hide behind the all too familiar formula: "He is to blame for everything." (Nor is this true for individuals only. The psychology of the "scapegoat" will be touched upon in the next section.) What makes projection especially malicious is that, in general, the characteristics which one dislikes in another person are exactly those which, without realizing it, one possesses oneself. For this reason, *in spite of conscious rejection, they exercise a secret fascination upon the psyche*. One sees examples of such phenomena in situations where a conscious "no" is counterbalanced by an unconscious "yes"—when a murderer, against his will, keeps returning to the place where the crime was committed, or when a person possessed by hate simply cannot let the object of his supposed hatred alone. Similarly the resistance in analysis—which can be one of the most obstinate shadow projections—points to a hidden attraction to the analyst.

It seems as if the archetypal value, the bigger personality, hidden in the shadow projection, is desirous of becoming conscious, of being integrated into the conscious personality.

Such disunited behavior confirms the contradictory nature of the ego and the shadow and implies that the original "whole"—that is, the total personality—has been cut in two by the sword of consciousness. But which of the two sides of this totality is "good" and which is "evil"? Is the good represented by the individual's conscious attitude, and is the shadow therefore evil? This assumption has a certain validity, for since the shadow is *less differentiated* and often inferior, it can be—viewed psychologically—actually a mischiefsman, *an individual evil, making adaptation to the world more difficult*. On the other hand, one could ask oneself whether it is not the conscious attitude, or consciousness itself, which is evil, since it tears asunder the unity of paradisiacal innocence? I refer you to Genesis 2:9.

Be that as it may, ego and shadow belong to one another, as the "light" belongs to the "dark" brother. If the light is too emphasized, then there will be deflections toward the dark side. One-sided

behavior brings about an equally one-sided, but opposite, response. Both sides together are the expression of a universal psychic tendency, namely, the balancing, or *complementary* and *compensatory* activity of the unconscious. In the psyche, as in organic life, the emphasis is on the establishment of a natural balance of forces. Jung's investigations have shown that there is a *central factor* at work in the soul, which, by compensating psychic one-sidedness, works toward the completeness of the individual. Jung has called this factor the *self*. The image of the self is a hypothesis which has proved extremely fruitful for understanding the factors in the psyche and their relation to one another.

The more opportunity one has to follow the processes of human development, the more one recognizes that the unconscious psychic impulses tend toward the completeness, rather than the perfection, of the personality. Jung's empirical investigations have confirmed James' earlier conclusion that the attainment of a greater equilibrium between the psychic opposites signifies a release from the sense of incompleteness.²⁰ Time and again one can observe that something in man tends to compensate the conscious attitude through the recognition of sides that have been previously neglected—of weaknesses and imperfections. When this tendency is not accepted by consciousness, the shadow will generally appear anyway,²¹ but then in an unconscious and pernicious form.

The personal shadow is therefore a reality to which we dare not close our eyes. It is a completely normal factor in life, which is connected with man's development of consciousness. Whether it will be good or evil from the collective standpoint depends on the attitude of the conscious personality, since personal convictions, ideals, or attitudes may either conform to collectively recognized values or stand in contradiction to them. In both cases, however, the personal shadow is less differentiated and less developed, so that it will at first be experienced as a disturbing factor, perhaps even as an individual evil. However, its relativity in respect to the conscious personality in no way lessens the moral problem which it represents. Bringing the shadow to consciousness is a psychological problem of the highest moral significance. It demands that the

individual hold himself accountable not only for what happens to him, but also for what he projects. Only by acknowledging the inferior personality, which is just as real and effective as the conscious purpose, can the individual achieve the instinctual confidence which makes him capable of a positive relationship to the opposite sex. *Acknowledgment of the personal shadow is also required for every further coming to terms with unconscious forces.* Without the conscious inclusion of the shadow in daily life there cannot be a positive relationship to other people, or to the creative sources in the soul; there cannot be an individual relationship to the Divine.

V. *The Phenomenon of the Collective Shadow, or of Archetypal Evil*

So far we have dealt with the problem of evil as a personal problem. We have seen that fundamentally the personal shadow is connected with the subjective attitude of the individual; that is, that it is relative and complementary to the conscious personality. Seen from the collective, therefore, the shadow can be either good or evil. *The psychology of evil, however, includes much more than the consideration of the personal shadow.* The contents of the personal unconscious are transparent, and through them we can see the universally human factors of the psyche. In other words, the personal shadow, or individual evil, conceals universal evil. As Jung describes it, the shadow is

" . . . that hidden, repressed, for the most part inferior and guilt-laden personality whose ultimate ramifications reach back into the realm of our animal ancestors and so comprise the whole historical aspect of the unconscious."²²

Time and again one can ascertain that, in coming to terms with the personal shadow, the individual arrives inevitably at the point where he is confronted with autonomous powers which are simply superior to his will. Such a development is a very normal phenomenon; it accompanies the *widening of a purely personal motivation into a more objective attitude.* But in spite of its normality, the

encounter with the numinous factors of the psyche is at first often experienced as an overwhelming threat to one's own being. Accordingly, the affects and projections associated with it are characterized by an obstinacy which we cannot modify either by feeling or by insight. What man has not been haunted by the fascinating image of a beautiful woman, which gave him no peace? What woman has not been captivated by the charms of a masculine mind, which meant wisdom and reason to her—and even godlikeness. Such projections of the images of the animus and anima upon individuals of the opposite sex will not be discussed here. However, it is relevant to the psychology of evil that, in such projections, there may be hidden anxiety-producing contents which point to the immoral and evil. It often happens in dreams that, behind the animus, the image of a witch, or a woman poisoner or child-eater, may be discerned, whereas the anima may conceal a diabolical figure, a satyr-like Pan, or a usurper or traitor. Very often it is difficult to determine the boundary of the pathological. Possession by collective evil is most frequently observed in individuals whose ego-personality is relatively weak, or whose personal shadow is not sufficiently recognized. In any case, the more such contents run counter to collective morality—that is, the more their character is amoral and immoral—the more certain it is that they represent archetypal moral evil. Moreover, the stronger the resistance they meet with, the higher their emotional charge. If the pressure from the unconscious is too strong, the affects will erupt as hate or backbiting, as aggressiveness or self-destruction. I should like to remind you of the case of Nietzsche contra Wagner, or the bitter battle which Kierkegaard carried on with certain members of the Danish State Church. In Nietzsche's and Kierkegaard's projections, evil appeared as treason—that is, *the evil doer was a "traitor."* Nietzsche had seen in Wagner's previous work the perfect example of devotion to the Dionysian; therefore the Christian strain in Parsifal was for him not only a great disappointment, but also a betrayal of the god Dionysus. For Kierkegaard, who fought for religious sincerity, the attitude of the church representatives, their dogmatic views, meant betrayal of the individual's relation to God. These are typical experiences of shadow

projection—that is, of the projection of evil—whose compulsive character, however, already overlaps with the pathological.

Similar complexes can be seen in analytic work. The resistance of the analysand to the analyst may take the form of defensiveness, of hatred, or of open aggression. This may be an expression of the analysand's frustration because he is unable to break through his concretistic, personal involvement and reach a more objective attitude. Or it may be an attempt—even though a negative one—to find a standpoint of his own. Such situations are extremely subtle, and they can take a turn for good, as well as for evil. The individual may remain stuck in his defense reactions, or be overwhelmed by negative contents, or, on the other hand, he may come to terms with the superior man in his soul. Whatever the situation, it is essential that the psychologist not overlook the possibility in the shadow of a *creative breakthrough*, or of a deeper *religious viewpoint*.

The image of evil becomes more threatening when the prevailing moral viewpoint loses its convincing strength and the predominant image of God loses its credibility. The less the individual feels himself supported by the spirit of the times, and the less he is able to orient himself to a set of absolute values, the more clearly a corresponding insecurity—amounting even to anarchy—arises in the unconscious. In other words: *the contradictory opposites of the time are torn asunder* so that what was previously good becomes compensated for, or eclipsed, by evil. If the rupture between the conscious morality and the unconscious compensatory values reaches a pathological degree of dissociation, then the unconscious can no longer be differentiated from that which the spirit of the time rejects as evil and immoral. *The individual's experience of evil then becomes identical with the collective shadow*, with what is despised by the collective as evil.

Whenever an individual is overwhelmed by the collective shadow, an extremely dangerous situation is constellated, which may finally extend to the collective itself.

The collective shadow manifests itself externally in two ways: *either personified in a leader, who represents the momentary collective evil, or as a mass phenomenon.* Personifications of collective

demons are all too fresh in our minds: think of Cesare Borgia, Napoleon, Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler! Such leaders show all the traits and qualities that have been rejected and repressed by their contemporaries and particularly those branded as bad and immoral by the cultural canon. Not only is the collective shadow alive in such leaders; *they themselves are representatives of the collective shadow, of the adversary, and of evil.* Wherever the image of evil is incorporated in an individual, demonic effects are radiated, equal in magical, suggestive power to those radiating from the incarnation of the "light" God-image. No wonder they always threaten the existent social order with disorder and dissolution!

No less dangerous are the effects of the collective shadow *in the form of mass phenomena.* In this case, it is the masses which are gripped, if not actually possessed, by the figure of the "adversary." Corresponding to the *abaissement du niveau mental* characteristic of mass phenomena, the content as well as the accompanying emotion of a collective projection expresses itself in a highly uncivilized and primitive manner. The suggestive power and contagious quality of a collective emotion is apparent in the *persecution of those of another faith or another race.* They are the scapegoats upon whom are projected all those suppressed contents which seek expression in the collective, but which, because they are unconscious, remain completely misunderstood. Evil and the negative are always projected to the other; the religious dissenter becomes the enemy who betrays the light of faith, and the person of another racial group becomes the primitive who endangers civilization. Think of the burning of witches which lasted into the nineteenth century! In many cases the witch presented a welcome figure upon whom could be projected that evil spirit rumbling in the unconscious—the spirit which was in league with the Antichrist, with the demons and spirits of nature. Did those Dominican monks in the fifteenth century, who wrote the horrible book *Malleus Maleficarum* (The Witches' Hammer),²⁸ ever realize what their preoccupation with the archetypal image of the Devil's prostitute could tell us about their own psychology?

All these manifestations of the collective shadow—in the in-

dividual, in the masses, or in the leader—have at their roots universal problems of evil, which concern politics, racial questions, and religion. They are of concern to the individual and to large groups of people, even to our whole civilization. Since it is the image of evil, or that of the "adversary," which underlies them all, one can equate the collective shadow with the archetypal shadow—in short, with the archetype of evil!

Goethe's *Faust* shows us evil in its universal human aspect. It also illustrates most clearly the nature of the personal and of the collective shadow. We can interpret the various characters in the play as reflecting the inner drama in the soul of the leading figure. Wagner represents the overdiligent, zealous assistant "who continually sticks to commonplace stuff" and is the *personal adversary* of Faust, the seeker for the "mirror of eternal Truth." Wagner is the "other" in the personal psyche who is omnipresent—always at the heels of the teacher—and who shows up the absurdity, the grotesqueness even, of trying to learn "what holds the world together." In contrast to Wagner, Mephistopheles is the *transpersonal, archetypal shadow figure* in Faust's soul. Mephistopheles is the devilish counterpart to the "light" figure which illuminates Faust's spirit and, as the prologue in heaven shows, he is actually the adversary of God himself. As the negative spirit par excellence, he represents the universally human capacity for evil, which is as much a part of man as the universal disposition to good. Just as Faust exemplifies an entire era—the era of humanism with its belief in the dignity of man and reason—Mephisto is the representative of something greater: the *collective shadow of the humanistic age.* The collective evil of humanism is impulse, unbridled passion, the striving for pleasure, power, and expansion. As an archetypal figure, Mephisto is connected with the transpersonal which, regardless of its momentary good or evil characteristics, points to a superordinate meaningfulness, or even meaninglessness. He is also that portion of the psyche which has preserved the *living relationship with nature, and with the whole historical past.* He not only leads Faust to the "Mothers" and animates the whole magic of the witches' kitchen, but he also leads Faust to Helen, the primordial image of classical

beauty. As the "strange son of chaos," Mephisto is actually the "son of night," of the unconscious, the adversary of the "light" world of the spirit. He is an evil that threatens the worlds of humanism and of Christianity, but that also presents the creative possibility of something new.

Whenever the figure of the adversary is constellated, the question arises: How will the conflict between the collective powers of good and evil end? This question is also behind the wager between the Lord and Mephisto: Will the principle of evil be successful in diverting the "good" man, with his "sinister impulse," from the "path of righteousness"? Like his prototype in the Book of Job, the adversary in *Faust* is extremely paradoxical. With the famous words: "I am part of that power which always wants to do evil, and yet always creates the good," Goethe discloses the actual nature of the adversary; evil appears in a new light. The possibility is suggested that good may be found, not only in the personal shadow, but also in the "son of chaos," in the archetypal shadow. In the drama, Goethe allows Mephisto to intervene in Faust's fate when, in despair, he curses spirit and life, and is close to suicide. At this moment of extreme distress the Devil appears as a trickster who rouses the one wearied of life to new life and new activity. His incitement to pleasure and life, however, has a drawback: it means at the same time being led astray in the opposite direction, and exposes one to becoming a victim of this unknown world. The danger is all the greater since Faust had given up nearly all contact with his natural side, that is, with other people. In the pact with the Devil Faust exposes himself to this other side. If he should ever acknowledge that a moment was beautiful, he would lose the bargain. Who actually won this wager? Faust, or Mephisto? The Lord, or Mephisto? In the drama it is Faust. However, Goethe's solution is not convincing, since Faust's salvation is the result of a cheap trick, an uncalled-for intervention on the part of the Divine. Goethe's solution was a concession to the spirit of his time, which demanded that the erring son be led back to the arms of the Heavenly Mother, whereas, in actual fact, Faust had withstood none of the devil's temptations—neither that of love, nor gold, nor power.

It is Jung's great merit that he took note of the power and meaning of such symbolic figures. This led him to the discovery of the structural elements of the psyche, which have universal meaning, and which he called archetypes. By this term Jung wishes to point out not only the *archaism*, but also the *meaningfulness* of these universal centers of force. Even though, strictly speaking, borderline concepts like the archetype have only the character of working models, certain things can still be inferred by investigating their manifestations. Archetypes appear to be actual determinants in human life, which affect the conscious personality in a regulative and compensatory way. Of special importance for the psychology of evil is the fact that the bipolarity of the archetypes *seems to point to a tension of opposites*, and that, according to the attitude of the individual, one side or the other predominates. If, for instance, the individual has a tendency to identify himself with the positive side of culture, the archetype of the self constellates the opposite side and forces him to come to terms with what collectively is considered negative. In the contrary case, if the individual accedes to what is collectively considered evil, the encounter with the central archetype can prepare the way for a reconciliation with the neglected "good." Last but not least in importance is the fact that past, present, and future are always included in the archetypal context of meaning. For, through the activation of the archetype, the individual experiences a relationship to something greater which not only unites his present experience with the past, but also—because of its precedence—with the future. Because of these qualities of the archetypes—their regulatory function, their latent bipolarity, and their transcendence of time—the image of evil and the image of the adversary can also lead to an experience of new meanings which transcend the one-sidedness of the spirit of the time and prepare the way for a transformation.

The archetypal traits of the adversary can be seen in myths and fairy tales, as well as in religious legends. The phenomenon of evil is especially apparent in the figures created by the *Judaean-Christian spirit*. Professor Maag has contributed²⁴ an impressive

description of the figure of the *Antichrist*: he sees him as the power of "darkness" and of "chaos," who represents the opponent either of the Messiah or of God himself. The Antichrist is the radical evil, who dissolves the status quo and threatens order. Another aspect of evil is seen in the Old Testament Satan who incites God to doubt Job's faithfulness. A further aspect is represented by the Satan of the New Testament, who tempts the Son of God, in the desert, to take over the kingdoms of this world. A most peculiar aspect of good and evil appears in the book of Hosea, where God himself appears as the Devil's advocate, and enjoins the prophet to marry a prostitute and to have children by her. (Hosea 1:2) He wants to use the collective figure of the prophet as a paradigm, to show the people that they have prostituted themselves and are being unfaithful to Him. God manifests himself here in an obscure way. He is in fact the teacher of his people, but the outer appearance is an incredible reversal of his traditional nature. However, if one considers Hosea as a person rather than as a representative of the collective, the situation is different; he then seems to be confronted, by God's command, with an inner necessity, which is not only opposed to the morally good, but even demands actual evil. The light is so darkened here that the archetypal image of God cannot be differentiated from evil, because it is God himself who commands evil. Undoubtedly, the most problematic aspect of evil is seen in Judas, who through his betrayal of Christ brings about the crucifixion of perfect goodness. This action impels the Christian drama of salvation to its climax, and reveals the whole paradoxical character of the figure of Christ. I shall not try to elucidate this extremely subtle problem, because I feel it is beyond my competence.

In all these examples, the fundamental importance of evil for the religious life is apparent. Evil either provides the conditions for the development of something new, or it throws brighter light on what has always been considered "good." On the other hand, it can also demonstrate the inadequacy of the old image of God. These examples show that evil apparently possesses a function which need not necessarily be destructive.

VI. *The Function of the Collective Shadow or Archetypal Evil*

From the most varied starting points we have been led to the main problem of the psychology of evil, the function of the archetypal figure of the adversary, both in the individual and in human evolution. Is evil, the archetypal shadow, merely a negative factor in life, an obstacle which must be overcome? Or, in some circumstances, does evil prove to be a good? Psychology cannot give an unequivocal answer to this question.

The seductive and destructive power of evil is rightly feared; for it possesses a secret attraction, which is all the greater the more one resists it. We have observed this magnetic power of the "unknown" in the personal shadow. In the first example, we saw that the degree to which an individual is caught by shadow contents is directly proportional to the degree to which they are rejected. The fascination in individual evil is due to the values buried there, which complement the conscious personality to form a totality. No less impressive is the magnetic power of the collective or archetypal shadow. It possesses that superior and numinous and often compulsive fascination which is so characteristic of archetypal figures. This compulsiveness indicates, among other things, that often the archetypal shadow is the only possible *access to the lost levels of the soul*, for one of its essential functions is to lead the individual back to his buried possibilities. The function of collective evil in human life is most clearly shown in the individuation process, a transformative process par excellence.

Here, too, William James can be considered a pioneer. Apart from recognizing the relativity of good and evil, he discerned the importance of the experience of evil in religious conversion. He noted that in many cases it is evil itself which brings a person's attention to his false attitude toward the Creator. James considered that this attitude becomes false whenever the individual depends on general beliefs and convictions, instead of on the uniqueness of his own inner experience. On the other hand, if a person accepts the challenge to experience God directly, he may also, under some circumstances, be led to the abyss of the "unknown," and to evil itself.

Studies of the individuation process corroborate the fact that *there can be no self-realization without the experience of evil.*

Recognition of the reality of evil seems actually to be the first stage in establishing a relationship with a centralizing factor in the psyche. Furthermore, the function of evil shows itself to be the direct result of the contradictory, dynamic nature of the self-realization process. Just as the self is apparently a paradoxical phenomenon which includes both contradiction and unity, the self-realization process has two separate phases of development which correspond to the first and the second half of life and seem to lead to opposing goals. In accordance with this enantiodromia, not only do the goal and values of the conscious personality change in the course of this development, but the shadow also changes its function and its attributes. Whereas in the first half of life the centralizing factor "aims" at strengthening the ego-personality by neglecting any and all incompatible values, in the second half of life it seeks an opposite goal. *What was previously right, now appears to be wrong.* At a definite moment of time, the self seems to "demand" that the personality be made complete, *through the recognition of what were up until then hostile, immoral, and asocial tendencies.* If the individual does not voluntarily attend to this other side, he reaches an impasse. All those values which till now were legitimately neglected, repressed, or suppressed, can now become causes of stagnation and illness. Occupational difficulties, crises in human relationships, bodily symptoms, or even periods of self-doubt and feelings of inner emptiness, can be the result. It is as if the conscious personality were thrown into a civil war, where each side consumes the energy of the other. *At such a moment the personal shadow is experienced as the pivot which decides whether the further development shall be for good or evil.* Such an event compels the individual to self-reflection. To accept the "other's" demand for recognition means *accepting the tension between the opposites of a conscious "yes" and an unconscious "no."* Unless he is willing to endure the tension of these opposites, he will never achieve the dependability and instinctual certainty which are necessary in order to relate to the other sex, to the creative sources in his psyche, and to the Divine. And with-

out this relation there can be no self-realization.

As a result of the inner demand for recognition of the opposites, a new potential accumulates in the psyche, and archetypal symbols are constellated. Due to their strangeness and incomprehensibility, these symbols often appear to be in opposition to the conscious situation. Very frequently such symbols first appear in archetypal dreams, where the figure of evil plays a role. In the recent past, it often took the shape of the anti-Semite, the Communist, or the National Socialist. Dream figures of the traitor and the dangerous animal are also frequent symbols of evil. Such archetypal contents point to something which the conscious personality cannot, or will not, accept without further question as belonging to itself alone. The affects connected with these images point to emotions which concern not only the individual, but also the collective. That inner situations in which evil becomes a problem arise naturally in times of moral, political, and social instability, requires no explanation. The uncertainty in the outer world merges with the instability of moral values in the inner world, and it is often not possible to tell which is primary. The figure of the adversary, in such cases, compensates both the individual and the collective distress. For both problems, an answer is constellated in the center of the personality, which—as Jung demonstrates in his discussion of flying saucers²²—manifests itself in symbols of "roundness."

The result, as we learn from the phenomenology of the individuation process, is paradoxical. This process is in its essence a *mysterium iniquitatis*. For, at a certain moment in life, not only the personally repressed and inferior, but also the immoral, the pathological, and even the senseless, acquire the importance of a *conditio sine qua non* for psychic renewal. That evil can point the way to psychic totality appears astounding from the standpoint of traditional morality. But this is possible because evil has preserved the original connection with the archetypes and the age-old paths of nature; it has access to the lost depths of the soul, to the vast background of human culture. In the figure of Mephisto we could see the connection of evil with the passions, with the personal life history, and with the historical past. Under favorable circumstances,

this enables the adversary to act as a bridge, which reunites man with the source of life. The potentially positive function of evil is therefore to bring man back to his source and, simultaneously, to its unrealized higher meanings. Thus evil may open the way for spiritual renewal and relationship to the self.

Evil is of fundamental importance also in the creative process. For although creativity is usually evaluated as exclusively positive, the fact is that *whenever creative expression becomes an inner necessity, evil is also constellated*. The creative process is at the same time both productive and destructive. When something new is coming into being, it inevitably conflicts with what is old. Think of the fate in the Middle Ages of those who dared to harbor thoughts contrary to the canons of the Church! Since the inner necessity from which the creative individual acts is usually related to the external collective situation, the new revelation is opposed not only to his own conscious morality, but also to generally accepted collective values. At times it may even bear witness to the inadequacy of the God-image. Thus we see that creativity is an ambiguous divine gift, which does not necessarily embody only the good, but can also represent the extreme opposite—namely, collective evil. As the individual experiences it, creativity is a highly ambivalent prerogative; its breakthrough into his existence may mark the high point of his life or, inversely, the nadir. In the latter case the creative impulse may act as a demon, snuffing out the will of the ego, and showing a thoughtless, even cruel, disregard of personal wishes. It is as if the new had to be paid for at the price of personal happiness. In such situations, the will to create is experienced as a power which destroys and overthrows the status quo, as an objective evil which pushes man to the very limits of his being. Acceptance or rejection of the inner call not infrequently decides the problem of survival, for both the individual and the collective life.

The specifically moral aspect of evil is experienced by the individual in the so-called "conflicts of duty," in which he has to choose between two obligations. Most often the choice lies between two competitive moral systems, or *between a moral precept and the demands of the self*. In the latter case, the individual is very often

"forced" from within—against his conscious will—to do something immoral. On the other hand, the culture canon can be felt to be so binding that the decision goes against the demands of the self. In general, the only choice is between a greater and a lesser evil. We have already mentioned the conflict that confronted Abraham: whether to obey God and kill his son, or to obey the universal moral law and oppose God's command. In his lecture on conscience²⁶ Professor Schaefer mentioned the equally acute conflict in Luther—when he opposed the indulgences—the conflict between traditional belief and freedom of conscience. It appears that, in his case, the objectively valid moral law was suspended in favor of an inner necessity. To remain true to oneself, and to wait until consciousness has become mature enough to decide between contradictory duties, requires an unusual amount of courage, humility, self-sacrifice, and also, above all, consciousness. The religiously oriented person usually experiences the resolution of such conflict as the influence of an impersonal authority: he feels it to be "grace," or sees in it the incidence of the correct moment, the *kairos*. The "call," however, can also be experienced as a curse, forcing one to be "different" from other men, and to commit just that evil which consciousness resists most violently.

I should like at this point to present an example from my practice, in which an *archetypal dream brought about a decisive turn toward self-understanding*. The person concerned was a woman in her fifties. She was intelligent and extraverted, and had an active life behind her. She had lost contact with her feminine instinct, because it was suppressed by a superstructure of puritanical precepts. During the first part of her analysis she tried to become conscious of her unrealized sexual and aggressive fantasies. It was a painstaking job, which was repeatedly blocked by her puritanical attitude. During the process of coming closer to her inner feelings she had two exceedingly important dreams.

In her first dream she heard an ominous sound, like a blast of thunder, which was heard over the entire world. The day after this, she dreamed that a powerful gorilla blocked her way into her apart-

ment. Although she was terrified, she was able to pass him unhurt, and in time she even learned to endure his presence.

These dreams, which announced the breakthrough of a long-dreaded "unknown," made a powerful impression upon her. They immediately aroused conflicting feelings; on the one hand, she had the impression of a threatening disaster, and on the other, she felt as if she had received a communication from something transpersonal. She felt that not only the blast of thunder, but also the ape, were expressions of the numinosity of the Godhead. She remembered the threatening sounds in the Bible stories, where God appears in an earthquake, in the wind, or in fire. Her cultured background also helped her to find several mythological parallels to the symbol of the ape. I will mention only the Indian ape Hanuman, and the Egyptian god Thoth who is often portrayed with an ape's head. Both figures showed her the paradoxical aspect of the ape; his sub-human quality as well as his holiness and wisdom. To the ape she also associated the alchemical role of the Devil, who as the ape of God is his demonic opponent. These symbolic parallels helped her to see in the ape not only the animal, but beyond this a symbol which unites the most primitive and unspiritual with the most wise. She learned with a sense of enlightenment that behind the primitive sexuality of the ape there stands a divine image which represents the wisdom of life. As a result of this insight she gained a better understanding of her own sexual wishes and aggressive impulses. She recognized that the *acceptance of these previously suppressed and detested impulses* could perhaps help her to get closer to the *wisdom of her instincts*, and to the life spirit buried in her soul.

I have frequently had the opportunity, in my psychological work, to observe that the appearance in dreams of dangerous animals—like the bear, the black snake, the rat, or the weasel—is related to the transformation of darkness and evil.

Such dream phenomena, which are not at all unique, show that man's *reconciliation with the chthonic aspect of his soul is today a collective problem*. It is as if the animal soul wanted to complement the "all-too-airy" intellectual aspect of ego-consciousness in

order to form a totality. Why an animal should be a symbol of evil is not immediately clear. But it is very evident that this meaning is given to animal symbols in our culture which, due primarily to the influence of Judaeo-Christian morality, identifies good with spirit, and evil with instinct. This hypothesis is shared by Nietzsche, who saw the collective evil of our present culture in the "denaturalization of life's values" and in the "blond beast." The more an individual finds the goal of his life in the ascent to the heights of spirit and reason, the more certainly the shadow will take the opposite path, and will descend to the darkness of Tartarus. There it will join the dregs of the underworld—namely, the animalistic and the materialistic. Such a dissociation should not astonish us at the end of our era. The intellect has climbed to such a perilous height that only primitive nature can effect a compensation. The dream of the ape shows us that healing is to be found in a reconciliation with those aspects of nature which have been thought of as evil.

VII. *How to Deal with Evil*

Although it is possible for evil to be transformed into good, we must not overlook the fact that this is only a possibility. Man's highest virtues are called upon when he is confronted with evil. The most subtle problem of the psychology of evil is how one should deal with this adversary—this numinous and dangerous opponent in the psyche—so as not to be destroyed by it.

One can make a wide circle around evil, and assert that it must be sublimated, or suppressed. On the other hand, as Nietzsche suggested, one can ally oneself with it—with the reverse side of morality—and help the blind will to live to achieve realization. These two attempts at a solution, which are those which occur to one first, have directly opposite goals. The psychologist who follows the first method aims at making evil ineffective, by reuniting the individual with the collective morality, or by getting him to limit his own desires for self-development. In his later writings, Freud pointed out the curative effect of "education to reality," and the training of the intellect.²⁷ He attempted to achieve both these ends by

strengthening Logos against the powers of Ananke (ominous fate). Nietzsche took the opposite position, the second method. In contrast to Freud's pessimism, he proclaimed a Dionysian affirmation of the world, and a passionate *amor fati*.²⁸ He praised not only the superman, but also the evil of the subhuman, of the blond beast. Both these attempted solutions are one-sided, and bring about a dissociation between conscious good and unconscious evil. For, as we have tried to demonstrate, "too much morality" strengthens evil in the inner world, and "too little morality" promotes a dissociation between good and evil.

In this connection I should like again to refer to William James, who—consistently following up his insights into the function of evil—saw spiritual health in the completion of human personality to form a harmonious whole.²⁹ Not moral perfection, but the promotion of the rejected complementary attitude, is the basis of a religiously stable personality. James saw the deeper secret of the conquest of good and evil in the unconditional acceptance of the dictates of the unconscious self.³⁰ Although he did not overlook the risk of being placed at the mercy of the inner voice—since one can never be sure whether it is the voice of God or the voice of the Devil—he maintained that the individual's surrender to the transpersonal and the unconscious was the only way to salvation.

As Jung's investigations show, dealing with evil is in the end an individual secret, which one can only describe in broad outline. Experience constantly demonstrates that there is no guarantee that the individual can meet the challenge and no objective criterion for what is "right" in each situation. The experience of the archetypal shadow leads into the utterly "unknown," where one is exposed to unforeseeable dangers. It is equivalent to an experience of the God-image itself, in all its sublimity and depth, its good and evil. Such an event transforms the whole man; not only his ego-personality, but also his inner adversary.

Coming to terms with the unconscious always entails the risk that one may give the Devil too much credit. One is indeed trusting him too far, if one overlooks the fact that confrontation with the archetype can result in error and corruption as well as in guidance

and truth. A message from the unconscious is not *eo ipso* to be equated with the voice of God. It is always necessary to question whether the author of the message is God or the Devil. This encounter can just as well result in a dissolution of the personality as in guidance on the path of wisdom. Therefore, mere surrender to, or blind faith in, the unconscious powers is no more satisfactory than a stubborn resistance to the "unknown." Just as an attitude of complete trust can be the expression of childishness, so an attitude of critical resistance can be a measure of self-protection. Not only in the art of medicine, but also in psychology, caution is important in the "dosage" of poison. Everything depends upon "how" one deals with the adversary. Too close an approach to the numinous—no matter whether it appears as good or evil—inevitably carries with it the danger of an inflation, and the danger of being overwhelmed by the powers of light or of darkness.

We can see in *The Devil's Elixir*, by E. T. W. Hofmann,³¹ what being overcome by the demonic can lead to. The author describes how the monk Medardus became possessed by the "mana personality" of Saint Anthony, and then in compensation fell victim to the unholy Antichrist. Intoxicated by his own eloquence and seduced by his lust for power, he was tempted to increase his effectiveness by taking a drink out of the Devil's bottle. By drinking the Devil's elixir he gained the secret of rejuvenation, but at the same time he fell into the Devil's power. His greed for love and the things of this world overpowered him and lured him to his destruction. As a result of this entanglement with the other side of his personality, his soul split into two autonomous systems, the body soul, and the spirit soul. Hofmann goes on to develop in a most impressive way the problem of what he calls the "double"—that is, the part of the soul which, though dissociated from the ego, nevertheless is its close companion. Equally impressive is the method he suggests for bringing the two parts of the soul together. It begins with Medardus' return to the loneliness of the monastery. There penance, insight, and remorse clear his beclouded senses, and for the first time, by realizing that moral goodness in nature is dependent on evil, he finds peace and release from his compulsive drives. This

relativization of good and evil, which depended upon a partial acceptance of the heathen adversary, also meant a change in his Christian consciousness. The body-soul, however, understands only slowly what the spirit-soul already comprehends, so that the problem arises again with the greatest intensity. As with Faust, so also with Medardus: it is only in the twilight zone between life and death that he finds the longed-for reconciliation of spirit and nature; then he experiences the reconciliation as the pure beam of eternal love.

I now want to touch upon the most important problem in dealing with the shadow. As Jung always emphasizes, the shadow is "the moral problem par excellence." This holds good for the personal as well as for the archetypal shadow: it is a reality which challenges the highest effort of consciousness. Consciousness of the shadow is decisive for the stability not only of the individual life but also in large measure of the collective life. To be conscious of evil means to be painstakingly aware of what one does and of what happens to one. "If indeed thou knowest what thou doest, thou art blessed; but if thou knowest not, thou art cursed, and a transgressor of the law."³² This is one of Jesus' apocryphal sayings. He said it to a Jew whom he saw working on the Sabbath.

Becoming conscious of the shadow sounds like a relatively simple demand. In reality, however, it is a moral challenge which is extremely difficult to meet. The task requires, first of all, the recognition of individual evil—that is, of those contra-values which the ego has rejected; and a simultaneous recognition of the conscious values of individual good; in other words, making the unconscious conflict conscious. This can mean (1) that a moral point of view, previously based on tradition, is now supplemented by subjective reflection, or (2) that the rights of the ego are given the same authority as the rights of the "thou," or (3) that the rights of instinct are recognized along with the rights of reason. Becoming conscious of the conflict is naturally experienced as an almost irreconcilable collision of incompatible impulses, as a civil war within oneself. *The conscious conflict between good and evil takes the place of an unconscious dissociation. As a result, unconscious in-*

stinctive regulation is supplemented by conscious control. One gains the ability to estimate more correctly one's effect on other people, as well as to recognize the shadow projections and perhaps even to withdraw them. And, finally, one is forced to consider revising one's views about good and evil. One realizes that the secret of a better adjustment to reality often depends upon being able to give up "the wish to be good" and allowing evil a certain right to live. As Jung rightly remarks, it appears that "the disadvantages of the lesser good" are balanced against "the advantage of the lesser evil."³³

Contrary to the general opinion that consciousness of the shadow constellates and strengthens evil, one finds repeatedly that just the opposite is true: knowledge of one's own personal shadow is the necessary requirement for any responsible action, and consequently for any lessening of moral darkness in the world. This holds good to an even greater extent in relation to the collective shadow, to the archetypal figure of the adversary, who compensates the collective consensus of the time. Consciousness of the archetypal shadow is essential not only for individual self-realization, but also for that transformation of creative impulses within the collective upon which depends the preservation of both individual and collective life. The individual cannot detach himself from his connection with society; *responsibility toward oneself always includes responsibility toward the whole.* One can perhaps even risk the statement: Whatever consciousness the individual struggles for and is able to transmit benefits the collective. By coming to terms with the archetypal adversary he is able to sense collective moral problems and anticipate emerging values.

But awareness of the moral conflict is not enough. Dealing with the shadow requires a choice between two mutually exclusive opposites as well as a realization in conscious life. There are three ways in which the individual can attempt to solve the problem. He can renounce one side in favor of the other; he can retire from the conflict altogether; or he can seek a solution that will satisfy both sides. The first two possibilities need no further discussion. The third seems at first impossible. How can contradictory opposites like good and evil ever be reconciled? According to the rules of logic, *tertium*

non datur. Reconciliation of the opposites, therefore, can only be achieved by "transcending" them; that is, by raising the problem to a higher level where the contradictions are resolved. If a person is successful in detaching himself from identification with specific opposites, he can often see, to his own astonishment, how nature intervenes to help him. Everything depends upon the individual's attitude. The freer he can keep himself of hard and fast principles and the reader he is to sacrifice his ego-will, the better are his chances of being emotionally grasped by something greater than himself. He will then experience an inner liberation, a condition—to use Nietzsche's phrase—"beyond good and evil." In psychological terms, the sacrifice of the ego-will adds energy to the unconscious, and leads to an activation of its symbols. This corresponds to the religious experience, in which the resurrection follows the crucifixion and the ego-will becomes one with the will of God. From either standpoint, the acceptance of sacrifice is the *sine qua non* of salvation. A transformation takes place in the symbols of both good and evil. Good loses some of its goodness, and evil some of its evil. As doubt of the "light" of consciousness increases, so the "darkness" of the soul appears less black. A new symbol emerges in which the opposites can be reconciled. I am thinking here of the symbols of the Cross, of the *T'ai-Chi-T'u*, and of the Golden Flower. For the individual, the emergence of such a symbol often brings a new understanding of the conflict, a neutralization of the opposites, and a transformation of the God-image. It always has a liberating effect on the soul; the conscious personality and the inner adversary both appear transformed. Whether it attacks us in the form of illness, external disorder, inner emptiness, or as a shattering invasion from within of an immoral demand, evil can finally prove to be a means of healing, which reconciles the individual with the central core of his being, with the self, the image of the Godhead. Whoever attains such a reconciliation will not only feel open to the creative, he will also experience again the tension of the opposites—this time in a positive manner—and so he will finally recover his powers of decision and action.

There is no general rule that determines what the decision will be. Whether the problem will be settled in the outer world as a better adaptation to collective morality, or vice versa, depends upon irrational factors. But one can at least expect that after the inner demands and needs have been considered the moral decision will be more complex and mature.

Such a decision will in some way include what the collective evaluates as evil. This does not mean a one-sided living out of evil. The individual can neither totally renounce evil, nor completely accept it. Undoubtedly, the one who, in the moral conflict, "can join the shadow to the light is the possessor of the greater riches."³⁴ However, there is no criterion by which to measure, how far, if at all, evil should rightfully be given a place in conscious life. Nor is there any criterion by which a decision can be judged good or evil—considered psychologically. Any moral judgment based on absolute principles always does violence to the uniqueness of the particular case. From the standpoint of psychology, submission to collective morality, or to a dominant faith, is no less "good," than submission to the symbol of wholeness. Each situation is unique and always requires its own unique answer.

Among the most important results of increased consciousness and growing self-realization is the ability of the individual to accept his own guilt. *There is no acceptance of the shadow, no possibility of allowing the shadow to live, without the simultaneous acceptance of guilt.* Life which is truly lived always involves becoming guilty. Man can no more rid himself of the fact of his guiltiness than he can cast off his relationship to the community, or to the self.

A sense of guilt is the prerogative of man, an advantage, so to speak, that he has over the gods. It is also the reason why man suffers—from his own nature and from his fate. If he has the courage to acknowledge his guilt, and to endure the realization of his own evil, he will find that the tyranny of the superego will decline proportionally, and that he will no longer remain caught in the unconscious guilt and anxiety which Freud believed to be inevitable. The more the individual accepts his own human imperfection, the more he accepts his evil—in religious terms, his sin—and

the more he suffers from it, the greater will be the moral meaning of his suffering. Without suffering there is no salvation—*sine afflictione nulla salus*—as the well-proven alchemical saying goes.

Acceptance of individual guilt includes to some extent the acceptance of collective guilt. It is just those people whose problems touch upon the contradictions of their time who, in coming to terms with collective evil, assume part of the collective guilt. They realize that they, too, are responsible for the events in the world. Consciousness of guilt and suffering are as inseparable from the process of becoming a human being as they are indispensable if the individual is to achieve any freedom of decision. Unless he recognizes his own limits, he can experience no consciousness of freedom.

In summarizing we can say: The polarity of good and evil belongs to human life. Wherever good is experienced, evil is also present. Self-development of the individual, therefore, also includes evil. Evil can even have great significance for the process of self-realization, since it is indeed a part of the creative primal cause. To attempt to destroy evil for rational reasons would be to destroy the very source of life. On the other hand, giving free rein to evil would lead to the same result. Coming to terms with evil is therefore a moral task which calls for the highest exertions on the part of the ego. It means consciousness, sacrifice, and a constant relationship to the center of the self. When such an attitude is maintained, even the paradox that evil can create good may become a reality. As Jung expresses it:

"Just as the conscious mind can put the question, 'Why is there this frightful conflict between good and evil?', so the unconscious can reply, 'Look closer! Each needs the other. The best, just because it is the best, holds the seed of evil, and there is nothing so bad but good can come of it.'"³⁵

1. Karl Kerényi, "Das Problem des Bösen in der Mythologie" in Böse. Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1961. p. 9 ff.
2. Immanuel Kant, *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics*. Translated by Thomas K. Abbott. London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1932. p. 21.
3. Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945. *Passim*.
4. *The Twilight of the Gods in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Edited by Oscar Levy. New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1964. (Future references in these notes to *Works* will refer to this set of books.) XVI, "Antichrist," sect. 25.
5. *Ecce Homo in Works*, XVII. p. 64.
6. "Wir müssen uns von der Moral befreien, um moralisch leben zu können" from *Nachgelassene Werke. Unveröffentlichtes aus der Umwertungszeit 1882-1888* in *Friedrich Nietzsches Werke*. Klein 8° Gesamtausgabe. Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag. (Future references to *Werke* will refer to this set of books.) XIII, p. 124.
7. "Man wird euch die Vernichter der Moral nennen; aber ihr seid nur die Erfinder von euch selbst" from *Nachgelassene Werke. Unveröffentlichtes aus der Zeit des Zarathustra 1882-1886* in *Werke* XII, p. 266.
8. "Die Moral? Sie bringt sich selber um" from *Nachgelassene Werke. Unveröffentlichtes aus der Umwertungszeit 1881-1886* in *Werke* XIV, p. 308.
9. Jung liked to emphasize that he took the term "shadow," if not precisely the concept, from Nietzsche.
10. E. Blum, "Freud und das Gewissen" in *Gewissen*. Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1958. p. 171 ff.
11. *The Will to Power in Works*, XV. "Dionysus" 1027, p. 405.
12. *The Will to Power in Works*, XIV. "A Criticism of Morality," p. 284.
13. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1922. p. 163. "... there is no doubt that health-mindedness is inadequate as a philosophical doctrine, because the evil facts which it positively refuses to account for are a genuine portion of reality; and they may after all be the best key to life's significance, and possibly the only openers of our eyes to the deepest levels of truth."
14. R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1935. p. 632. Taken from a letter to Hodgson: "For life is evil. Two souls are in my breast; I see the better, and in the very act of seeing I do the worse."
15. *Human All Too Human* in *Works*, VII. "The Wanderer and His Shadow," p. 186.
16. *Thus Spake Zarathustra* in *Works*, XI. "The Ugliest Man," p. 320 ff.
17. *Ibid.*, "The Wanderer," p. 183 ff.
18. Adelbert von Chamisso, *The Shadowless Man, Peter Schlemihl*. Translated by Sir John Bowring and illustrated by Gordon Browne. New York: F. Warne, 1910. Cf. *Peter Schlemihls wundersame Geschichte*. Stuttgart:

- Reclam Verlag, 1958. p. 27. "... wer keinen Schatten hat, gehe nicht in die Sonne, das ist das Verflüchtigste und Sicherste."
19. Hugo von Hofmannsthal. *Die Frau ohne Schatten*. New York: Boosey & Hawker, 1943.
 20. W. James. *Op. cit.*, p. 175. "... the process of remedying inner incompleteness and reducing inner discord is a general psychological process, which may take place with any sort of mental material, and need not necessarily assume the religious form."
 21. C. G. Jung. *Aion*. C.W.* IX,ii, 1959. p. 68 f.
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
 23. *Malleus Maleficarum*. Jacobi Sprenger & Henrici Insuperis: inquisitorum. Francofurt, 1590.
 24. Victor Maag. "Der Antichrist als Symbol des Bösen" in *Das Böse*. Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1961. p. 63 ff.
 25. C. G. Jung. "Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies," in *Civilization in Transition*. C.W.* X, 1964. p. 307.
 26. Hans Schaer. "Das Gewissen in protestantischer Sicht" in *Gewissen*. Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1958. p. 119 ff.
 27. Sigmund Freud. *The Future of an Illusion*. Translated by W. D. Robson-Scott. International Psycho-Analytical Library. 15. London: The Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1949. p. 86.
 28. *The Case of Wagner. Selected Aphorisms in Works*, VIII. p. 59.
 29. W. James. *Op. cit.*, p. 176.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 488 n. "Evil is not evaded, but sublated in the higher religious cheer of these [twice-born] persons."
 31. E. T. W. Hoffmann (Amadeus). *The Devil's Elixir*. (Translator anonymous.) Edinburgh: 1824.
 32. Code Bezae ad Luc. 6.4.
 33. C. G. Jung. *Mysterium Coniunctionis*. C.W.* XIV, 1963. p. 428.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
 35. C. G. Jung. *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*. C.W.* VII, 1953. p. 181.

* The letters C.W. refer throughout to *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*. R. F. C. Hull translator. Bollingen Series XX. New York: Pantheon Books.

THAT THE SCRIPTURES MIGHT BE FULFILLED A STORY

Hildegard Nagel

The disciples, though still bewildered to be tramping the lanes and roads with apparently no fixed goal ("Is it the wind that drives him?" queried Thaddeus once) and with many questions in their minds that sometimes reached their lips, were happy in their new fellowship that centered around the Master. Often weary and sometimes hungry, they were always carefree; and when at the end of the day they had washed their feet at the wayside and eaten their scanty pickings, they would gaze at one another in surprised joy. There was only one among them who seemed never carefree, and who clutched the money box in his charge as if here was his only fixed hold on their common life. Though each of the others wondered humbly how he himself came to be chosen, the wonder was often coupled with amazement that this Judas, of all men, should have been chosen, too. James the son of Zebedee had happened to be standing near and had whispered an account of the strange moment to the others. The Master with his long stride had walked over to the redhead, who stood apart as if nothing concerned him, and had said, with a power unusual even for him: "Come, you are needed, too." And over Judas' mocking face had fallen a look of terror; his restless eyes became fixed, and in a voice unlike his usual tuneless piping, a broken hollow voice, he answered: "Do not ask me." But the Master continued to look at him and said quietly: "It needs be." That was the end of the matter. He came with the rest. Yet he never mingled with them; he sat apart, and if he laughed it was always alone and contemptuously, as if at a joke he did not expect to be understood. Nor did it seem as if the Master had any joy of him either. When his eyes met those of Judas his face would grow somber, veiled by a dark mystery very different from the